The basic mechanics of shadow banking

Shadow banking creates liquidity outside the regulated banking system. Unlike traditional money, shadow money is constrained by the value of assets that serve as collateral. Therefore, shadow banking is vulnerable to market price declines. As shown in a new paper by Moreira and Savov, pro-cyclicality is compounded by collateral values falling more than asset prices when uncertainty is rising. This makes modern financial systems prone to collateral runs and liquidity crises.

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The trouble with (sterilized) FX interventions in emerging markets

Large foreign exchange interventions are common in emerging markets, typically in response to capital flows. What is less well understood is the expansionary (contractionary) impact of FX purchases (sales) on local credit, even if the transactions are sterilized. Sterilization securities mostly end up on banks’ balance sheets, where they function as substitutes for bank reserves, serve as collateral, and encourage banks to expand their loans-to-securities ratios.

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The vulnerability of modern dealer bank financing

Modern dealer bank financing relies largely on collateralized transactions. In order to achieve collateral efficiency institutions engage in rehypothecation, for example through matched-book transactions, internalizing trading activities, and re-pledging of margin collateral. A New York Fed article suggests that this funding structure faces risks from rollover, credit rating downgrades, and reputational considerations.

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The importance of central bank collateral frameworks

A new ECB paper illustrates the power of a central bank’s collateral framework as a policy tool. The collateral framework influences overall monetary conditions, helps preserving financial stability, and functions even at the zero lower bound for policy rates. Liquidity regulation can be an important complement, since by themselves generous collateral buffers might invite moral hazard and encourage excessive reliance on short-term funding.

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A theory of safe asset shortage

Ricardo Caballero and Emmanuel Farhi from MIT and Harvard propose an interesting and relevant formal model of safe asset shortage. While safe asset supply is constrained by the fiscal capacity of sovereigns and financial innovation, demand may be in a secular ascent (driven for example by collateralization and population aging). The resulting shortfall can result in a structural drag on economic growth and impair the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies, with some resemblance to the Keynesian liquidity trap.

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Consequences of the OTC derivatives reform

The OTC derivatives reform is nearing completion. It is designed to contain derivatives-related credit and contagion risk through standardization, multilateral netting, and adequate collateralization. However, new risks may arise, due to the enhanced importance of a small group of global banks, institutional weaknesses of central counterparties, limited collateral availability, and cyclicality of margins,

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Quantitative easing and the collateral problem

Another (IMF) paper of Manmohan Singh deals with the influence of non-conventional monetary policy on collateralized borrowing. In past years, quantitative easing (QE) has absorbed collateral from private funding markets and, thereby, reduced private repurchase (collateral) rates relative to policy rates. An unwinding of central bank balance sheets in the future could increase the spread between policy and collateral rates – if the collateral finds its way on bank balance sheets – or reduce the degree of financial “lubrication” – if it ends up with non-banks. Put differently, in a large-scale QE unwind central banks could temporarily lose  control over lending conditions.

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Fire sale risk through the U.S. repo market

The Federal Reserve Bank of New York continues to highlight the latent risk of fire sales in the tri-party repo market. The danger arises from an incentive to liquidate collateral in case the solvency of a dealer is in doubt. The risk is enhanced by the vulnerability of the main cash lenders intri-party repos, money market mutual funds and security lenders, to liquidity pressure. Policy tools to contain such an event are limited.

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On the risks of a new U.S. credit overheating

An interesting speech by Jeremy Stein emphasizes the ingrained tendency of financial institutions to boost earnings by selling tail risk insurance in forms not covered by covered risk measures and regulation. Hence, financial innovation, changes in regulation, and macroeconomic changes often result in credit market overheating through implicit subordination in conjunction with excessive maturity transformation. At present such tendencies may materialize in the rising share of low-grade credit issuance, the rapid expansion of agency mortgage REITs, and the increasing maturity of securities in bank portfolios. For the future, the expansion of collateral swaps and other forms of collateral transformation deserves attention.

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