The “de-anchoring” of inflation in the euro area

Two recent empirical studies highlight the risk that inflation expectations in the euro area are becoming de-anchored, similar to Japan. De-anchoring means that short-term price shocks can change long-term expectations. Importantly, the papers suggest medium- and short-term measures to track this de-anchoring. De-anchoring increases the risk of actual deflation and may add to the risk premia on equity and credit.

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Why decision makers are unprepared for crises

An ECB working paper explains formally why senior decision makers are unprepared for crises: they can only process limited quantities of information and rationally pay attention to rare events only if losses from unpreparedness seem more than inversely proportionate to their rarity. The less probable a negative event, the higher the condoned loss. Inattention gets worse when managers bear only limited liability.

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A refresher of European banking union and AQR

Nicolas Veron explains European banking union and its acronyms. The two main pillars are the SSM (Single Supervisory Mechanism), run by the ECB, and the SRM (Single Resolution Mechanism), run by the SRB (Single Resolution Board). Before taking up its new role next month, the ECB will publish a stress test and an AQR (Asset Quality Review). The new framework is expected to ease the home bias of banking regulation and the sovereign-bank “doom loops”. Deficiencies include a lack of area-wide deposit insurance and insufficient resolution funds.

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A lecture in euro area money markets

Paul Mercier, principal adviser at the ECB, has summarized the basics and recent history of euro area money markets. His tale emphasizes what investors often miss. First, the ECB balance sheet and excess liquidity are poor measures of lending conditions. Second, the great financial crisis has generated a structural rise in banks’ borrowing from the Eurosystem, over and above their liquidity needs. Third, full allotment policies in conjunction with (sub-) zero deposit rates have led to large and potentially volatile excess reserve holdings.

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Europe’s bank-sovereign nexus (revisited)

A Bank of Italy paper illustrates and explains the rise in European banks’ sovereign debt holding since the great financial crisis. It also reiterates structural causes for bank-sovereign feedback loops. One would conclude that this nexus remains an important factor for market dynamics and monetary policy.

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Target2 and the euro area crisis

Target2 is the real-time gross settlement system of the Eurosystem. It allows central banks to redress reserve losses that result from balance of payment deficits. A working paper of the University of Siena illustrates how Target2 prevented the euro area sovereign crisis from escalating into large-scale defaults and devaluations. Limitations to Target2 could downgrade the monetary union to a fixed exchange rate regime, if international flows become large enough.

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The euro area’s persistent de-leveraging

The ongoing economic misery of the euro area periphery reflects the compounded deleveraging of corporates, households, financial institutions, and governments. According to a new IMF paper, the process could still take years to complete. Simultaneous deleveraging across all sectors typically causes negative feedback loops, constraining economic growth and credit conditions.

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New rules for euro area bank bailouts

Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, senior fellow of the Peterson Institute, has published an excellent summary on the euro area’s political deal for bank recapitalisation and resolution, targeted at breaking “doom loops”, i.e. escalating negative feedback of banking and sovereign solvency troubles. The key parts, from a market perspective, are (i) the possibility of direct recapitalisation of banks through the European Stability Mechanism (even retroactively) and (ii) stricter bail-in rules for private bond and equity owners.

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Discrediting euro area crisis-driven austerity

Paul de Grauwe and Yuemei Ji have produced disarmingly simple charts that show why the euro area’s 2010-12 crisis response is being discredited. Essentially they illustrate that (i) market conditions rather than fundamentals have driven large absolute changes of credit spreads, (ii) fiscal tightening has been a mechanical response to credit spreads, and (iii) austerity has largely been self-defeating. Such evidence of failed excessive austerity dovetails anti-euro populism, underpinning euro area policy change towards more accommodation.

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IMF reminder of incomplete euro area banking union

A new IMF Staff Discussion Note provides opinion and advice on the euro area banking union. It reiterates the urgent need for a single regulatory, resolution, and deposit insurance mechanism. The present legal and institutional reality falls well short of it and even last year’s adopted directives and plans only deal with the harmonization of rules and the creation of a single supervisory mechanism (SSM). A credible euro area-wide resolution and deposit insurance seems to be still a distant goal. The ESM’s ability to bear recapitalization losses, whether from “legacy assets” or not, remains uncertain.

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