The financial stability interest rate

The financial stability interest rate is a threshold above which the real interest rate in an economy triggers financial constraints and systemic instability. It is different from the natural rate of interest, which balances growth and inflation. Indeed, the relationship between the financial stability interest rate and the natural interest rate may be one of the most important predictors of medium-term market direction and future crisis risk. A low financial stability rate versus the natural rate will create a tendency for real interest rates to rise to levels that disrupt financial relations. Factors that lower the financial stability rate include leverage and asset quality in the financial system. It is possible to build time series of financial conditions and stability rates.

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Modern financial system risk for macro trading

Financial system risk is the main constraint and disruptor of macro trading strategies. There are four key areas of modern systemic risk. [1] In the regulated banking sector vulnerability arises from high leverage and dependence on funding conditions. The regulatory reform of the 2010s has boosted capital ratios and liquidity safeguards. However, it has also induced new hazards, such as accumulation of sovereign risk, incentives for regulatory arbitrage, and risk concentration on central clearing counterparties. [2] Shadow banking summarizes financial intermediation outside the reach of standard regulation. It channels cash pools to the funding of asset holdings. Vulnerability arises from dependence on the market value of collateral and the absence of bank backstops. [3] Institutional asset management has grown rapidly in past decades and is now comparable in size to regulated banking. Asset managers play a vital role in global funding conditions but are prone to aggravating self-reinforcing market momentum. [4] Finally, emerging market financial systems have grown in size and complexity. China constitutes a global systemic risk factor due to the aggressive use of financial repression to sustain high levels of leverage and investment.

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The consequences of increased financial collateralization

There has been a strong upward trend in collateralization since the great financial crisis. Suitable collateral, such as government bonds, is essential for financial transactions, particularly repurchase agreements and derivative contracts. Increased collateralization poses new risks. Collateral prices and haircuts are pro-cyclical, which means that collateralized transactions flourish when assets values rise and slump when asset values decline. This creates links between leverage, asset prices, hedging costs and liquidity across many markets. Trends are mutually reinforcing and can escalate into fire sales and market paralysis. Central clearing cannot eliminate this escalation risk. The collateral policies of central banks have become more important.

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How to use financial conditions indices

There are two ways to use financial conditions indicators for macro trading. First, the tightening of aggregate financial conditions helps forecasting macroeconomic dynamics and policy responses. Second, financial vulnerability indicators, such as leverage and credit aggregates, help predicting the impact of an initial adverse shock to growth or financial markets on the subsequent macroeconomic and market dynamics. The latest IMF Global Financial Report has provided some clues as to how to combine these effects with existing economic-financial data.

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Building international financial conditions indices

IMF staff has developed global financial conditions indices for 43 global economies. Conceptually, these indices extract the communal component of range of indicators for local financing conditions, independent of economic conditions. The idea looks like a good basic principle for building FCIs for macro trading strategies. The research on these indices suggests that [1] financial conditions are a warning sign for recessions, and [2] global financial shocks have a powerful impact on local conditions, particularly in the short run and in emerging economies.

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The risks in statistical risk measures

A DNB paper warns that financial market risk models (such as value-at-risk or expected shortfall) are unreliable. Small variations in assumptions cause large differences in risk forecasts. At commonly used small samples of data forecasts are close to random noise. It would take half a century of daily data for estimates to reach their theoretical asymptotic properties.

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The toxic combination of leverage and bubbles

A 145-year empirical analysis suggests that asset price surges are most dangerous when they are associated with rising financial leverage. The combination of housing price bubbles and credit booms has been the most detrimental of all. This bodes ill for modern leveraged housing price booms, such as in China.

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Why decision makers are unprepared for crises

An ECB working paper explains formally why senior decision makers are unprepared for crises: they can only process limited quantities of information and rationally pay attention to rare events only if losses from unpreparedness seem more than inversely proportionate to their rarity. The less probable a negative event, the higher the condoned loss. Inattention gets worse when managers bear only limited liability.

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China fears: updated basic background

Uncertainty over China’s exchange rate regime has accentuated local and global risks. Within China, fears of currency volatility and depreciation have reinforced capital outflows and asset price weakness. Globally, fears of ‘hard landing’ and financial pressure in China have reignited deflation concerns. Public information does not indicate a sharp slowdown or financial distress, but commentators distrust official data of an economy with great systemic vulnerability.

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Rules of thumb for banking and currency crisis risk

A new ECB paper explores macroeconomic indicators for banking and currency crises over the past 40 years. Banking crises arose mostly in constellations of [i] low credit-deposit spreads and high short-term rates (over 11%) or [iii] high credit-deposit spreads (over 270 bps) and flat or inverted yield curves. Housing price growth has also been a warning signal. Currency crises ensued from exchange rate overvaluation (more 2.7% above trend) and high short-term interest rates (over 10%).

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