A Fed view on low long-term yields

Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke recently explained globally low long-term yields as a combination of anchored inflation expectations, negative real policy rates, and a compressed term premium. The latter is seen as the key development since 2010 resulting from (i) the surge in private demand in the wake of reduced nominal volatility and negative correlation with risk markets and (ii) a surge in public demand resulting from asset purchase programs and FX reserves replenishing. Bernanke emphasizes that the Fed, markets, and forecasters all expect long-term yields to drift higher by 50-75bps per year through 2017. Yet, actually his reasoning would make a sustained directional change in yields contingent on fading crisis and deflation fears.

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Large currency moves and equity performance

Citi equity research investigates the relation between currencies and equity markets. It suggests that typically large currency appreciation (depreciation) coincides with underperformance (outperformance) of the equity market in local currency terms. However, the currency moves tend to be larger than the equity moves. This supports the case for hedging local-currency equity exposure against currency strength and USD-based equity exposure against currency weakness. Hedge ratios should be diverse across countries, as correlation with currency weakness is a function of industry structure. Emerging market equities have historically not always correlated negatively with currencies due to the prevalence of crisis events.

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CS on systemic risks of China’s shadow banking

Credit Suisse’s Dong Tao and Weishen Deng nicely summarize causes, size, and systemic risks arising from China’s rapidly growing shadown banking sector. Low regulated bank interest rates and rationed supply of credit have created ample incentives to by-pass the regular banking channels. By end-2012 the shadow banking sector has soared to about 44% of GDP and continues expanding at a torrid pace. Meanwhile, poor transparency and lack of risk management and regulation bode ill for credit and liquidity risks, and even a state bailout could involve a drastic deterioration of credit conditions.

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Discrediting euro area crisis-driven austerity

Paul de Grauwe and Yuemei Ji have produced disarmingly simple charts that show why the euro area’s 2010-12 crisis response is being discredited. Essentially they illustrate that (i) market conditions rather than fundamentals have driven large absolute changes of credit spreads, (ii) fiscal tightening has been a mechanical response to credit spreads, and (iii) austerity has largely been self-defeating. Such evidence of failed excessive austerity dovetails anti-euro populism, underpinning euro area policy change towards more accommodation.

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On the risks of a new U.S. credit overheating

An interesting speech by Jeremy Stein emphasizes the ingrained tendency of financial institutions to boost earnings by selling tail risk insurance in forms not covered by covered risk measures and regulation. Hence, financial innovation, changes in regulation, and macroeconomic changes often result in credit market overheating through implicit subordination in conjunction with excessive maturity transformation. At present such tendencies may materialize in the rising share of low-grade credit issuance, the rapid expansion of agency mortgage REITs, and the increasing maturity of securities in bank portfolios. For the future, the expansion of collateral swaps and other forms of collateral transformation deserves attention.

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IMF reminder of incomplete euro area banking union

A new IMF Staff Discussion Note provides opinion and advice on the euro area banking union. It reiterates the urgent need for a single regulatory, resolution, and deposit insurance mechanism. The present legal and institutional reality falls well short of it and even last year’s adopted directives and plans only deal with the harmonization of rules and the creation of a single supervisory mechanism (SSM). A credible euro area-wide resolution and deposit insurance seems to be still a distant goal. The ESM’s ability to bear recapitalization losses, whether from “legacy assets” or not, remains uncertain.

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ECB summary of China’s imbalances and risks

The ECB’s new “due diligence” paper on China reiterates why severe imbalances are inherent in the country’s high-growth model. Without a fundamental overhaul the key imbalances, such as overinvestment, large state control, and financial repression are likely to persist. For now, supply side conditions suggest that this model may still deliver sufficient (8% or higher) GDP growth. Yet as trend growth will inevitably slow, severe tail risks such as “widespread corporate defaults, systemic banking sector stress and social unrest” are looming.

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How inventory levels affect commodity futures curves and returns

A new Review of Finance article investigates the link between commodity inventories on the one hand and futures returns and curve backwardation on the other. Most prominently, low inventories mean that the convenience yield of physical holdings is high (more need of insurance against a “stock-out”). In this case, producers and inventory owners are willing to pay a surcharge for immediate access to the physical. This will (normally) translate into a higher risk premium, more backwardation, and higher expected excess returns. Moreover, external factors, such as price volatility, can induce producers and physical inventory holders to pay a higher premium for future price certainty that translates into a positive basis and expected return on futures positions. The inventory connection explains why commodity futures returns and futures curve shape are correlated, i.e. backwardation is more often than not a profit opportunity. According to this paper, mainstream theory is backed by empirical evidence for 31 commodities over more than 40 years.

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Currency dynamicis in risk-off episodes

A new IMF paper suggests that there is much more to exchange rate dynamics in “risk-off” periods than correlation-driven risk shedding. Indeed, it provides evidence that economic fundamentals, particularly external balances, re-assert themselves precisely during the first twelve weeks after market turmoil has erupted, when the asking price for incremental economic and policy risk is steep.

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