An updated paper by Adam, Beutel, and Marcet claims that booms and busts in U.S. stock prices can be explained by investors’ subjective capital gains expectations. Survey measures of these expectations display excessive optimism at market peaks and excessive pessimism at market troughs.
A new paper from the ETH Zurich defines bubbles as episodes of unsustainable and quickening asset price growth with accelerating corrections and rebounds. In order to recognize such patterns it is critical to focus on the broader picture and correct time scale, rather than concurrent detail. Bubbles arise from innovations, valuation uncertainty and various positive feedback mechanisms that make prices spiral away from equilibrium. A critical state is often indicated by asset prices growing faster than exponentially.
Bank of England’s Andrew Haldane has summarized the rise and risks of asset management in a recent speech. As demographics and economic development propel the industry to ever higher assets under management, self-reinforcing correlated dynamics become a greater systemic concern. Market conventions, accounting practices, regulatory changes and structural changes in the industry all contribute to this risk.
Nomura research has summarized evidence of oversupply of residential property in China. Urban floor space per capita is now estimated to be higher than in some developed countries. Land conversion is still rising, while urbanization is slowing. Potential triggers for a sharp correction include interest rate liberalization, capital outflows and property taxes. A plunge in property activity would have serious economic and financial consequences.
This post briefly summarizes why markets are struggling to price macroeconomic trends efficiently. The summary is identical to this blog’s page “Systematic Value III: Information Efficient Tracking of Macro Trends”, which is subject to continuous updates.
The systemic importance of commodity trading firms (CTFs) deserves attention. Key points to understand are [i] CTFs’ core business is logistics, storage and processing, [ii] they are exposed to basis risk rather than outright price risk, [iii] their profitability depends on volumes and derivatives markets liquidity, [iv] they perform little traditional bank-style term transformation, but [v] they are financial intermediaries, by offering funding and structured product services.
A new IMF policy paper defines global liquidity as the ease of funding in global financial markets. The concept is useful for understanding the commonality in global financial conditions, with four large financial centers dominating the world’s institutional funding. In the 2000s banks have been the main conduit of financial shock propagation, but asset managers may play a greater role in the 2010s (see also posts here, here and here).
A theoretical Bank of Japan paper suggests that instability and herding in bond markets arises from low overall confidence of investors, great importance of public information (such as central bank announcements), and high value of privileged information. This analysis goes some way in explaining drastic bond market moves in the age of quantitative easing, such as the 2013 JGB market sell-off.
The ECB has reviewed its own forward guidance in a global context. Forward guidance uses communication [i] to add monetary accommodation at the zero bound for policy rates and [ii] to contain interest rate volatility. The ECB sees its own version as ‘form of qualitative guidance conditional on a narrative’. It is a commitment to keep policy rates very low over a flexible horizon, based on a wide array of indicators supporting a subdued inflation outlook over the medium term. This is different from the Federal Reserve or the Bank of England, which use more quantitative outcome-based forward guidance.
Conventional wisdom is that markets are information efficient. Alas, a simple game-theoretical model illustrates that value traders only have an incentive to invest in research and information if (i) information cost is low enough, (ii) the overall market is sufficiently clueless, and (iii) market makers do not suspect value traders of being well informed. This leaves ample scope for the overall market to remain inefficient, even in the long run, with undesirable consequences for society as a whole.
